In its subsequent motion to set aside the Termination Order, the Appellant Club invoked a violation of procedural public policy. First, the Appellant raised an arbitrary application of Article R36 of the CAS Code by the Division President. The SFT swiftly dismissed this argument to the extent that the arbitrary application of the law does not fall within the scope of public policy and is not open to review; the SFT also considered that the aforementioned provision (which deals with the replacement of an arbitrator) is not of fundamental nature such as to ensure procedural fairness, and therefore its potential violation could not entail a breach of public policy.

Second, the Appellant invoked a violation of the principle of excessive formalism to the extent that the Division President failed to grant a short grace period, by analogy to Article R48 of the CAS Code, in order to appoint its arbitrator. The SFT dismissed the arguments linked to the pandemic and to the fact that the Appellant was only represented by its legal department and not by outside counsel. The SFT also dismissed the arguments that the Appellant promptly remedied this procedural irregularity and that such irregularity did not have an impact on the proper conduct of the proceedings, by reminding that procedural forms are necessary for the implementation of legal remedies in line with the principle of equal treatment. It also applied by analogy – and referred to examples drawn by – its previous jurisprudence, such as the failure to pay the advance of costs in time or the sending of the statement of appeal by simple fax.